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Abstract 
Various strands of the comparative capitalisms (CC) literature agree that the 
advanced economies have liberalized in recent years, bringing with it rising 
income and wealth inequality and job insecurity; although these perspectives 
differ in important ways, there is much common ground between them to explain 
this heightened level of inequality and insecurity. Through reviewing 
contributions to three key CC perspectives since 2007/2008, we argue that they 
have tended to focus on developments in co-ordinated market economies, leading 
to a neglect of growing structural crises in liberal market economies, which have 
contributed to the UK and the US entering uncharted socio-political waters. We 
extend recent work that emphasizes how variation between countries in labour-
market institutions, different corporate forms and states’ fiscal policies help to 
explain income and wealth inequality to highlight future research agendas that 
seek to combine more systematically these institutional areas to explain social 
inequalities, workers’ experiences and socio-political crises within capitalist 
systems. 
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Introduction 
Income inequality and job insecurity have increased in many developed economies, 
especially since the 2007/2008 financial crisis (Thelen, 2014). The persistent 
differences in inequality within and between developed economies and, more recently, 
right-wing populist backlashes, have highlighted the need for fuller understandings of 
the relationship between different forms of capitalism, social equity and crisis (Dorling, 
2018; Hall, 2015b; Morgan, 2016; O’Reilly et al., 2016; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  
We review the relevant comparative capitalisms (CC) literature since the crisis. 
Existing studies have tended to focus either on how economies characterized by non-
market forms of co-ordination are likely to become more de-regulated (Baccaro and 
Benassi, 2014, 2017; Hall and Thelen, 2009; Streeck, 2014b; Thelen, 2014; Whitley, 
2012) or the global spread of neo-liberalism (Jessop, 2012; Streeck, 2012; cf. Pradella, 
2017). Yet, neo-liberalism brings with it many contradictions and problems. Sandel 
(2012) highlights the moral and practical limits to the extension of markets: within 
many developed societies, markets have extended into a number of areas where 
previously their influence was more limited, including education, health, government, 
law, and family life. In turn, this undermines those moral and civic goods that make 
markets possible (Sandel, 2012).  
However, mainstream politicians have often been unwilling or unable to offer 
policy alternatives to liberalization (Kuttner, 2007), leaving a large proportion of the 
electorate demonstrably worse off (Kalleberg, 2009), and enabling populists to gain 
influence and/or power (Hopkin, 2017). This implies that, if co-operative features of 
markets recede and/or that a specific manifestation of capitalism does not deliver for 
many, the entire system may be challenged (Hopkin, 2017; Kalleberg, 2009). 
Furthermore, capitalist systems that have more co-operative features may be more 
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sustainable as they have a greater ability, relative to other capitalist forms, to better 
reconcile shareholder and stakeholder interests (Dore, 2000).  
However, much of the CC literature tends to downplay how institutions 
associated with the most liberal market economies, the UK and the US (Gamble, 2014), 
can lead to particularly marked increases in equality and insecurity (Hall, 2015b; Hay, 
2013; Hay and Payne, 2015; cf. Williams, 2017), and, potentially, socio-political 
instability (O’Reilly et al., 2016). For instance, the UK and US display the highest 
levels of inequality (see figures 1 and 2 below) and high levels of wealth inequality 
(Alvaredo et al., 2018). Indeed, rather than most advanced economies defaulting to neo-
liberalism, the UK and US have entered uncharted socio-political waters, raising 
questions about their relative stability. This has significant implications for capitalism 
as a global phenomenon, especially as the liberal market economy (LME) model has 
been upheld as the gold standard for emerging markets (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). 
However, evolving capitalisms in state socialist countries, such as China, may continue 
on a distinct trajectory (Zhang and Whitley, 2013).  
We argue that there is a need to explain not only changes in the levels of income 
inequality and job (and occupational) security, in general, but also differences between 
LMEs and other types of market economy and, indeed, between LMEs themselves. By 
focusing on overall growth and employment, the existing literature tends to downplay 
systemic outcomes that still leave many (or, indeed, most) worse off, in turn making for 
socio-political problems (Lavery, 2018). In other words, the recursive relationship 
between inequality experienced by individuals and societal changes is important 
(Halford and Strangleman, 2009; Strangleman, 2017; Watson, 2009), and, indeed, may 
eclipse broadly positive ‘headline’ figures around growth. We build on existing work 
that emphasizes the influence of labour-market systems (Thelen, 2014, 2019) as well as 
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different corporate forms (Kristensen and Morgan, 2018) and the broad role of the state 
(Morgan, 2016) to put forward a research agenda that more systematically captures 
these explanatory factors.  
 
Boundaries of Analysis 
Work on capitalism and comparative capitalisms has a long history (Giddens, 1970; 
Lane, 1989; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Melling, 1991). We use the term ‘CC’ to 
encompass work that adopts a largely geographical perspective and that draws on socio-
economic analysis to compare, inter alia, variations in formal and informal regulation, 
the nature of firms, their competitive strengths, and the associated cross-country 
patterns of inequality and comparative advantages (Jackson and Deeg, 2008). The three 
approaches we review are: 1) the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Jackson and Deeg, 2008) and the related business systems theory (BST) (Whitley, 
1999, 2003, 2012), 2) historical institutionalism (HI) (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992; 
Thelen, 1999), and 3) the régulationist literature, and its recent developments and 
extensions, including the Social Systems of Production (SSP) approach (Hollingsworth 
and Boyer, 1997) and the literature on variegated capitalism (Jessop, 2012). We 
recognize that the differences between these three approaches are not always as distinct 
in practice as we propose here, and that individual analyses do not necessarily fit 
consistently or neatly into one of our three categories (Wood, 2013). The primary focus 
of this article is on capitalisms within the developed world; however, where salient, we 
make reference to other forms of capitalism. 
The CC perspective differs to mainstream economics and finance approaches 
(for example, Djankov et al., 2003), which tend to adopt a narrow, ‘uni-dimensional’ 
view of institutions and their influences, centring on the institutional foundations of 
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private property rights and assuming that this single institutional feature over-rides all 
others (Boyer, 2011; Whitley, 2003).  
We examine the emphases these frameworks place on different explanatory 
factors and highlight the implications for societal inequalities and broader socio-
political stability. We provide, in Figures 1 and 2, key measures of income inequality; 
such measures are important indicators that often form part of broader analyses (Halford 
and Savage, 2017; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). We recognize, however, that such 
measures alone do not capture all nuances of social inequality (Goldthorpe, 2010). Both 
figures show Gini coefficients before and after taxes and transfers. Figure 1 shows data 
for 2008; Figure 2, 2016. Both figures reveal that, even though the UK and the US did 
not have the highest levels of income inequality before taxes and transfers, they did 
after, indicating that their governments play a relatively limited role in reducing market-
based income inequality. This role has persisted and the current CC literature does not 
fully consider it when explaining income and wealth inequalities. 
________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
________________ 
 
________________ 
Figure 2 about here 
________________ 
 
Methods 
We focus on the dynamics of individual capitalist systems as well as capitalism per se in 
developed economies. We have stopped short of conducting a full systematic review, 
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but have, nevertheless, attempted to do justice to the CC literature since 2007/8; during 
this period a re-assessment of capitalism has taken place (Morgan, 2016; Streeck, 2016; 
Thelen, 2019). We seek to capture how themes within three strands of the CC literature 
have evolved since the end of the ‘Great Moderation’, which lasted from approximately 
1989 until 2007/2008 (Coates, 2015). Generally, sustained economic growth, buoyant 
labour markets and rising living standards in advanced capitalist economies 
characterized the Great Moderation, leading the CC literature to focus on capitalist 
variation rather than capitalist commonalities (Coates, 2015: 18–20). 
 
VoC and BST Frameworks 
Drawing together key strands of comparative political economy, an influential 2001 
edited collection first laid out the VoC framework, which combines an analysis of 
institutions and societies with an assessment of rational economic actors’ strategic 
interactions (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Focusing on how institutions generate and sustain 
trust and enhance knowledge within economies, business systems theory is more 
explicitly sociological (Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001). Both perspectives have 
traditionally focused on the diversity of firms, production and their capabilities and how 
institutions help or hinder companies solve particular co-ordination problems rather 
than the dynamics of capitalism or the consumption of finished products and services; 
by doing so, they identify patterns of firm behaviour within particular national 
archetypes (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999).  
This does not mean that all firms within a particular national economy will 
behave the same; however, the diversity of company forms and capabilities will be 
bounded (Wood et al., 2009). Although differences exist between the two approaches, 
both place growth within the context of relative stakeholder well-being; both, therefore, 
8 
 
differ from orthodox economic approaches to comparative institutional analysis 
(Djankov et al., 2003). 
Initially, both perspectives viewed institutions and patterns of economic 
organization as relatively stable (Boyer, 2005; Hall and Thelen, 2009; Thelen, 2014). 
When institutional change did occur, the VoC and BST perspectives focused on how 
diverse groups of collective actors responded to exogenous challenges, such as the 
internationalization of markets, advances in technology and the collapse of communism 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001: 56–60; Morgan, 2005; Whitley, 2012). They did not 
incorporate developments from within the institutional system itself into their analyses 
(Boyer, 2005; Streeck, 2012).  
Some recent contributions, however, highlight 1) how collective actors 
continuously test the limits of existing institutions to maximize the distributive benefits 
accruing to them or the coalition that they represent, 2) the role of financialization in 
institutional change and 3) the recursive effects of greater liberalization and austerity on 
future liberalization (Kristensen and Morgan, 2018; Morgan, 2016). This important 
development highlights capitalism’s dynamic qualities (Hall and Thelen, 2009; Morgan, 
2016; cf. Wood and Lane, 2012) and recognizes, therefore, that any dominant set of 
institutional arrangements is always conditional and contested.  
The key issue here is the argument that endogenous and exogenous factors are 
likely to undermine particular institutions, such as labour-market regimes and corporate-
governance codes, that do not conform closely to liberal-market precepts, leading, 
typically, to conclusions that emphasize the weakening of institutional systems that 
enable obligational forms of contracting and ‘non-arm’s length’ modes of exchange 
(Morgan, 2014, 2015; Whitley, 2012).  
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Whilst some of this research does not assess the ramifications of increasingly 
liberalized forms of capitalism for different forms of inequality (Morgan, 2015; 
Whitley, 2012), some does, arguing inequality is increasing in many countries (Morgan, 
2016; Morgan and Kristensen, 2014). This latter work typically builds on existing 
theories. First, key arguments draw on Polanyi's (2001 [1944]) notion of a ‘double 
movement’ to highlight how the state, reflecting societal pressures, uses funds from 
taxation and borrowing to provide social and economic benefits to individuals based on 
citizenship rights rather than market power (Morgan, 2016: 1; Morgan and Kristensen, 
2014). Second, these arguments draw on Weberian and Polanyian insights to emphasize 
how some actors seek to extend the market’s breadth and depth (Morgan, 2016; Morgan 
and Kristensen, 2014; Morgan and Whitley, 2012). Finally, these contributions cite 
Marx and Schumpeter to explain how markets and competition develop dynamically, 
often leading to increased inequality (Morgan, 2016).  
By drawing on Polanyi to highlight potential ‘double movements’ and by 
emphasizing the dynamism of capitalism more heavily than they did, recent VoC and 
BST contributions resemble HI ones. However, unlike the HI and regulation 
approaches, the VoC and BST perspectives tend also to highlight how variation in 
corporate-governance regulations influences the types of firm that exist in different 
countries and their abilities to pursue particular objectives, helping to explain 
differences in societal outcomes, including income inequalities (Kristensen and Morgan, 
2018; Morgan and Kristensen, 2014). 
 
Historical institutionalism 
HI tends to focus on particular policy areas within broader political structures, often 
seeking to explain secular political processes (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992; Thelen, 
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1999). It analyses how collective actors, such as businesses, business organizations and 
unions, initiate and contest political developments within existing political structures 
and policies, such as decision-making procedures, the constitution of political parties 
and electoral systems (Thelen, 1999). Institutions, therefore, not only structure actors’ 
context, but also their understandings of problems and potential solutions (Steinmo and 
Thelen, 1992; Thelen, 1999). The HI literature tends, therefore, to focus overtly on 
political contests, resulting, we argue, in the inadvertent downplaying of crises that are 
more likely to affect the most liberal forms of capitalism than they are other forms of 
capitalism in developed economies (Deeg, 2012).  
Political contests do not necessarily mean that economic and financial elites are 
always able to determine institutional regimes (Emmenegger and Marx, 2011). Instead, 
they must compromise and are likely to seek to adapt those compromises in their 
favour, whenever possible, to promote less constrained market relations, both within 
and beyond the workplace (Thelen, 2012). However, the 2008 crisis has led influential 
historical institutionalists to conclude that national institutional arrangements that 
mediate and inhibit ‘free’ labour markets are progressively unwinding, with all nations, 
even if at different paces, entering an era characterized by unmediated market relations 
(Streeck, 2013; Thelen, 2014, 2019). 
Polanyian notions of double movements influence such arguments (Polanyi, 
2001; Streeck, 2014a): periodically, political settlements seek to constrain the negative 
consequences of unbridled markets; these are then, in turn, challenged by counter 
pressures (Streeck, 2014a; Thelen, 2014). This means that there can never be a durable 
final institutional settlement (Streeck, 2012); capitalism develops along a dynamic path 
between state and market, and each period of state or market mediation is 
fundamentally different to preceding phases (Streeck, 2014a).  
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However, the emphasis on these double movements differs in HI work. Whilst 
HI analyses conclude that greater marketization is occurring, some work focuses on 
capitalism and other work highlights the potential for some actors to restrict the growth 
of the market. For instance, Streeck, (2014b) implicitly relies on a non-agential model 
of capitalism to explain socio-economic outcomes: it is capitalism itself that pursues 
relatively unencumbered and autogenic expansion (cf. Polanyi, 2001). Other accounts 
draw to a greater extent on Polanyi's (2001) notion of a ‘double movement’ to stress 
how ‘society’ may be able to act as a possible brake on increased marketization 
(Baccaro and Benassi, 2017; Benassi et al., 2016; Crouch, 2013, 2014). These latter 
studies tend, however, to argue that societies are largely unable to stop the erosion of 
institutions that prevent 1) the commodification of many forms of work and economic 
activity (Kinderman, 2017; Regini, 2014), and, consequently, 2) increased inequality 
(Greer and Doellgast, 2017); subsequently, they typically view institutional change and 
greater marketization as a process immanent within capitalism (Baccaro and Benassi, 
2017; Crouch, 2013, 2016; Streeck, 2009, 2014a), making it difficult to explain 
variation in income inequalities both between and within different types of capitalism.  
Such arguments also echo, in part, Marxian and Weberian logics about 
developments within capitalism that highlight how production or capitalism can become 
an end in itself rather than a means either to demonstrate one’s religious piety or to meet 
immediate material needs, leading to a lack of choice for individuals but to become a 
part of the capitalist system and the commodification of many forms of labour (Parsons, 
1929: 43; Watson, 2009; Weber, 2001: 123–124). 
These assessments often stem from a focus on Germany (Baccaro and Benassi, 
2014, 2017; Kinderman, 2017; Streeck, 2009). The close scrutiny of any type of 
capitalism is likely to make some change or shortfall visible. Some HI literature focuses 
12 
 
on Germany and its experience leading up to, during, and after the so-called Hartz 
reforms. These reforms changed labour-market and social-welfare policies significantly, 
and they followed recommendations by the Committee for Modern Services in the 
Labour Market, chaired by Peter Hartz (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016). By focusing on 
Germany, such HI work may, inadvertently, have over-estimated market liberalism’s 
robustness and under-estimated the relative durability of the German model’s core 
features. For instance, recent work has highlighted how large German industrial 
foundations and families that own firms have closed ranks to ward off relatively short-
termist UK and US institutional investors, even as other interests have continued to 
push for liberalization (Haberly, 2014).  
When research focuses on other countries, the analysis often concentrates on 
how relevant collective actors cannot prevent the weakening of unions and collective 
wage bargaining, leading to increases in income inequality (Amable, 2017; Baccaro and 
Howell, 2017; Thelen, 2019). There has been a tendency for historical institutionalists 
to see change as primarily a political process, led by defectors from a particular 
institutional order who would gain materially from the changes they propose (Amable, 
2017; Crouch, 2016; Kinderman, 2017). This analytical focus can potentially explain 
pre-tax and pre-transfer income inequality, but cannot address post-tax and post-transfer 
inequality. Such work, therefore, downplays how the state influences inequality, and, as 
Durkheim, (1960: 378, [1893]) noted over a century ago, how existing wealth 
inequalities influence earnings opportunities (see also Bukodi and Paskov, 2018).  
Moreover, HI often suggests that any model of capitalism is likely to be 
unsustainable precisely because it is capitalistic (Baccaro and Howell, 2017; Streeck, 
2014a, 2014b), downplaying the particular problems associated with liberal forms of 
capitalism and how fiscal policies influence levels of market-based income inequality. 
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However, Thelen’s (2019) work stresses analysing labour-market institutions, such as 
unions and collective wage bargaining, and their variation across countries to explain 
employment insecurity and, by extension, income inequality.  
 
The Régulation Approach  
We define the régulation approach broadly to encompass those who contribute 
explicitly to it as well as those who adopt a similar, but different perspective and who 
may use alternative labels, such as the Amsterdam School (Boyer, 1990). It focuses on 
the links between the industrial paradigm (the mode governing the technical and social 
division of labour), mode of régulation (that looks at the factors that influence 
individuals’ behaviour), accumulation or growth regime (the typical patterns of 
consumption and production as well as how a national economy, typically, grows), and 
modes of development (when the former three work together for a sufficient period of 
time to ensure a long wave of growth) (Boyer, 2005, 2011; Jessop, 1990, 2001: xxvii).  
More specifically, a mode of regulation is the ‘[en]semble of norms, institutions, 
social networks and patterns of conduct that can stabilize an accumulation regime’, and 
the latter ‘a complementary pattern of production and consumption’ (Jessop, 1990. p. 
xxvii). Both are spatially and temporally confined, and the former is of very much 
shorter duration and scale than the traditional Marxist concept of a mode of production. 
It emphasizes the inherently unstable nature of all forms of capitalism (Boyer, 2005, 
2010), with sets of institutional arrangements providing temporary, contingent, and 
spatially and temporally specific ‘fixes’ (Amable, 2016). This, in turn, highlights the 
endogenous characteristics of many instances of institutional change (Boyer, 2005, 
2011; Jessop, 2012). The approach also highlights the inter-connections between 
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different types of capitalism (Boyer, 2011) and how this can lead to increases in 
inequality in some countries (Jessop, 2014c).  
Rather than seeing the firm as the arena in which embedded formal and informal 
rules are simply enacted and reconstituted, drawing on its part-Althusserian ancestry 
(Lipietz, 1993), the régulation approach accords a central role to the process of 
production and the inherent tensions it embodies (Boyer, 1990). Indeed, régulation 
theory initially focused on explaining the conditions under which Fordist modes of 
production and consumption provided stable growth for many years, but ultimately 
declined (Boyer, 2005; Jessop, 2012).  
As régulation theory builds from the idea that capitalist systems are inherently 
dynamic and prone to crisis (Boyer, 2000; Jessop, 1997), it was quicker than the VoC 
and BST approaches to identify and analyse financialization (Boyer, 2000, 2013b), 
which continues to develop (Davis and Kim, 2015; Jessop, 2014b). Although an 
emphasis on financialization may suggest greater liberalization is ineluctable, the 
régulation approach did, initially, consider the possibility of new institutional fixes 
emerging that might nurture and replicate more co-operative forms of work organization 
(Boyer, 2004).  
Indeed, Boyer’s earliest work on finance explored how financialization might 
underpin a new wave of growth; however, this work concluded that, at most, finance 
could only constitute part of a much more diverse production regime (Boyer, 2000). 
Moreover, change in one part of the system does not equate to systemic change. Boyer 
(2006) argues that aspects of the shareholder value model have infused Germany’s 
mode of régulation; as other traditional aspects of the system, such as employment 
relations, have remained intact, a new configuration has emerged, but it remains distinct 
from the LME model. 
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Recently, though, the régulation approach’s primary concern has been to 
highlight the causes of the present-day crisis, and the mechanics of institutional re-
design (Amable, 2017; Becker and Jäger, 2012; Boyer, 2011; Jessop, 2014c); indeed, 
régulation theory has increasingly questioned the possibility of bringing about 
alternatives to neo-liberalism, as key strands of HI have also done (Boyer, 2010; Jessop, 
1989; Vidal, 2013). There has also been an increased and explicit focus on 
financialization, most notably by Boyer (2000, 2010, 2011, 2013), but by others as well 
(Becker and Jäger, 2012; Jessop, 2013, 2014b, 2014c). Although the literature on 
financialization is undeniably diverse and has many strands, including postmodernism, 
régulation theorists placed it within its broader historico-spatial context and saw it less 
as a departure from, and more as a reflection of inherent features of, capitalism (Westra, 
2019). 
For instance, the dynamics of capitalism has increased financialization in many 
countries, leading to a loss of informational content and enhancing systemic risks 
(Boyer, 2013b). Moreover, financial capital and inherited wealth are often 
misrepresented or repackaged as entrepreneurially generated; only through 
understanding how financial capital and inherited wealth are reproduced, is it possible 
to fully comprehend how they feed into job insecurity and income inequality, both in 
the creation and reproduction of vested interests as well as individual and collective life 
chances (Herlin-Giret, 2017; Mayer, 2016).  
In general, the régulation approach is more overtly critical of neo-liberalism than 
the VoC/BST perspective (Boyer, 2005, 2010; Jessop, 2014a, 2014b). In addition and in 
common with HI, the approach suggests that capitalism’s dynamics, acting through 
financial firms, shareholders and managers, leads to greater de-regulation and increased 
income inequality (Boyer, 2010, 2011; Jessop, 2014a; Mayer, 2016).For instance, 
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reflecting régulationist thinking, Lazonick's (2017) work highlights how financialization 
has resulted, in the US, in speculative investments outweighing investment in 
production capabilities, leading to the decline of traditional large corporations capable 
of generating decent work, employment security and social equality (Urry, 2014). The 
régulation approach has, therefore, highlighted how common features of capitalism can 
explain increases in inequality and associated socio-political problems; however, it has 
tended to downplay the role of the state and diversity between different types of 
capitalism. 
 
Limits to liberalization?  
A common CC theme is that wealth generation requires some production process of 
goods or services. Hence, financialization primarily represents a process of wealth re-
allocation: highly fungible assets, and those assets that can readily be liquidated into 
highly fungible forms, are prioritized over non-fungible ones (Wood, 2013). The latter 
include not only money sunk into plant and machinery, and associated processes, but 
also organizations’ human capabilities that are difficult to quantify (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Whitley, 1999).  
Such developments help to explain why the LME model faces strong challenges 
and contradictions that other forms of capitalism do not (Wood, 2013; Wood and 
Wright, 2015). As recent global value chain theory highlights, greater outsourcing of 
production to low-wage economies has meant that dominant parties and intermediaries 
have been able to capture more of the value/wealth created by production (Pradella, 
2017; Urry, 2014), at the expense of those involved in the actual production process 
who gained more from traditional, spatially contiguous production networks (Lane and 
Probert, 2009). Whilst resistance can sometimes prevent this process (Luthfa, 2017), in 
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many instances, opposition may be difficult because of horizontal divisions and 
problems of co-ordination amongst countervailing actors (Lane and Probert, 2009). 
Outsourcing and offshoring can, therefore, diminish the process of production and 
labour’s contribution, ultimately creating greater income and wealth inequality (de 
Thierry et al., 2014; Standing, 2011) as well as other forms of inequality within and 
between societies that are difficult to capture using nationally based measures alone 
(Urry, 2014).  
In addition, social protection, which was already relatively weak in LMEs, has 
diminished further (Hay, 2011), increasing the stakes. Similarly, LMEs’ over-inflated 
housing markets have made the property ladder inaccessible to growing numbers of 
individuals, especially those in younger generations, undermining the ability of house-
price increases to off-set income inequality (Bone and O’Reilly, 2010).  
Mainstream politicians have often been unwilling or unable to offer policy 
alternatives to these challenges (Kuttner, 2007), resulting in socio-political blowback 
(Kalleberg, 2009) and the rise of right-wing populist politicians (Hopkin, 2017; Mayer, 
2016), who have attained political power not only in many peripheral and emerging 
economies, but also in the two archetypical LMEs, the US and the UK. Despite posing 
as challengers to the establishment, such leaders are typically personally wealthy and 
aggressively rent seeking, and have secured the patronage of specific sub-segments of 
financial capital (Dörry and Dymski, n.d.). Whilst the populist right is a global 
phenomenon and have made headway in many countries, it has only captured power, 
amongst the mature LMEs and co-ordinated market economies (CMEs), in the US and 
the UK. Moreover, owing to a long period of political stability, the US’s and the UK’s 
political institutions, conceived of hundreds of years ago, may be particularly ill 
equipped to withstand a period of populism without lapsing into civil disorder or 
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authoritarianism. From the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, sociologists were much 
preoccupied with the relationship between constitutional legacies, and economic and 
political disorder (Durkheim, 1960; Henry, 1983; Levine, 1971). A long period of 
growth and stability does not mean that all within the financial and political elite 
become permanently wedded to democracy (Giroux and Bhattacharya, 2017).  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
A prolonged period of uncertainty, volatility and stagnant real incomes for the majority 
has challenged, to varying degrees, CC contributions’ initial assumptions on 
institutional stability and path dependence, leading to a growing consensus across the 
different strands of the CC literature on 1) the temporally specific and contingent nature 
of institutions and 2) the tensions between embedded, nationally distinct firm 
behaviours and common trends across the global capitalist ecosystem. In addition, a 
common argument is that developed economies are likely to experience increasing 
liberalization. Although the emphasis may vary, much of the existing CC literature 
highlights the increasing importance of labour-market systems (Greer and Doellgast, 
2017; Thelen, 2014, 2019) and the ‘restless nature’ of capitalism itself (Boyer, 2013a; 
Morgan, 2016; Streeck, 2014b). We do not dispute the importance of these processes to 
explain increasing liberalization and, hence, rising inequality in many countries.  
However, the evidence suggests that income and wealth inequality as well as 
social and employment security continue to vary significantly across developed 
countries. Existing analyses on advanced economies focus largely on market-based, or 
pre-tax and pre-transfer, inequalities, neglecting how states reduce inequality and how 
states vary in the degree to which they reduce inequality by.  
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Although advanced economies have liberalized many aspects of their 
economies, the UK and the US have the highest levels of post-tax and post-transfer 
inequality. As noted above, the marketization of more areas of social life can weaken 
the social ties that markets need to function well in the first place (Polanyi, 2001; 
Sandel, 2012). That process may be underway in the UK and the US; however, much of 
the literature focuses on liberalization of other countries or regions (Baccaro and 
Benassi, 2017; Hall, 2018; Iversen and Soskice, 2013; Streeck, 2009; cf. Hay and 
Payne, 2015).These other countries may liberalize less if open-ended crisis increasingly 
characterizes the LME model. 
The two largest liberal states’ chronic inability not only to provide income and 
occupational security, but also to prevent declines in the material conditions of the bulk 
of their populations has led to a rise of populism in these countries (Froud et al., 2016; 
Hopkin, 2017; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). As theories of relative deprivation indicate 
(Runciman, 1966), poverty and inequality are often associated with compliance, but a 
significant worsening of material conditions increases notions of relative deprivation 
and the prospect of social unrest (Davies, 1962). 
Right-wing populism’s greater breadth and depth in the UK and US, compared 
to CMEs, and its relationship to income inequality, suggest the persistence of diverse 
outcomes (Hall, 2015a; Hay, 2011). Our analysis suggests three useful areas for future 
research. First, we need to analyse the causes of income inequality by extending 
existing theories that emphasize labour-market institutions, including unions and wage 
bargaining (Baccaro and Howell, 2017; Thelen, 2019). Such extensions could 
systematically analyse how the state and some firms influence inequality (Lain, 2016; 
Melling, 1991; Urry, 2014; Zhang and Whitley, 2013) as well as the broad patterns of 
society and social change that influence how that role varies both across countries and 
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over time (Halford and Strangleman, 2009). There remains, therefore, a need for 
comparative studies to examine how institutions structure contrasting outcomes, 
including how various groups or classes experience work (Strangleman, 2017), both 
within and between different countries (Urry, 2014).  
Second, studying the links between different models of capitalism and the role 
of (trans)national actors, on the one hand, and equality and socio-political outcomes, on 
the other, necessitates comparative analyses of the dynamic interplay between various 
actors, including elites, businesses, business associations, unions, charities, that may be 
largely regional, national or transnational in character (Luthfa, 2017; Morgan, 2016; 
Urry, 2014; Zhang and Whitley, 2013). Building on insights from fiscal sociology 
(Schumpeter, 1991 [1918]), such analyses could examine how the structure and power 
of elites, including multinational firms and large technology companies, influence 
states’ abilities to tax them and how the elites’ relative loyalty towards the systems that 
nurtured and serve them helped, in part, to increase right-wing populism in the UK and 
US (O’Reilly et al., 2016). The role of the German industrial foundations and families 
in supporting the German political and economic system, and likewise the Japanese 
zaibatsu, contrasts sharply to some sub-segments of the Anglophone financial elite, who 
have covertly funded far-right causes and sought to undermine social consensus (Giroux 
and Bhattacharya, 2017; Mayer, 2016). Yet, like their Weimar counterparts, they may 
battle to ensure the populists, whose rise they have facilitated, remain servile to their 
interests (O’Reilly et al., 2016). Such phenomena and trends should be set within an 
analysis of how different forms of capitalism interact with one another to weaken or 
support institutions, creating different opportunities for populist politicians to exploit 
(Hopkin, 2017) as well as making the case for internationally embedded analyses of 
largely national institutional systems (see Jessop, 2014a). 
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Finally, the links between social inclusion, on the one hand, and social and 
political unrest and the rise of populism, on the other, remain unclear; yet these would 
appear to be of fundamental importance to understanding the development of different 
capitalisms. By emphasizing the range of social outcomes across different developed 
economies, our work suggests that future research should assess how social action and 
developments in political preferences shape institutions (Morgan, 2016). Such work 
would supplement existing research that focuses on the interactions between 
institutions, on the one hand, and firms and, for example, their investment and 
employment decisions, on the other. It would also lead to a greater understanding of the 
material conditions under which more sustainable models of capitalism emerge and 
prosper. Interestingly, CMEs have adopted renewable energy much more vigorously 
than have LMEs, where populist politicians have become shrill in their evangelization 
of hydrocarbons (Wood et al., n.d.). Exploring the interlinkages between stakeholder 
and environmental wellbeing, and how any counter movement from neo-liberal excess 
can deepen them, represents, therefore, a fertile area for future enquiry. 
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Figure 1 Gini Coefficients before and after taxes and transfers, 2008 
 
Source: OECD 
Notes: The Gini coefficient compares cumulative proportions of the population against 
cumulative proportions of income they receive, and it ranges between 0 in the case of 
perfect equality and 1 in the case of perfect inequality. 
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Figure 2 Gini Coefficients before and after taxes and transfers, 2016 
 
 
Source: OECD 
Notes: Data are for 2016, except: Denmark 2015, Ireland 2015, and New Zealand 2014. 
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